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With the approach of the new millennium last year, many market participants resolved to limit
their exposure to Y2K-related risks by cutting back normal trading activities. The Federal
Reserve foresaw that the widespread adoption of such a strategy could lead to serious liquidity
problems in key financing markets. Consequently, the Fed undertook to create a Standby
Financing Facility that would provide securities dealers with a form of backup funding 
and ease market anxieties about year-end credit conditions.
Last year’s century date change posed a unique 
challenge to the nation’s capital markets and the Federal
Reserve’s monetary operations. Fears were widespread
that Y2K problems might cause the computer systems
of market participants to malfunction, upsetting trading
and market-making activities. Of particular concern to
the Fed was the possibility of a disruption in the short-
term federal funds and repurchase agreement (RP)
financing markets—markets critical to the effective
implementation of monetary policy.
The uncertainty about the functioning of technical
systems led many market participants to suggest that
they would curtail their normal trading activities and
apply credit limits very narrowly in the weeks before
and after the date change. Such precautionary steps,
while understandable, threatened to create exception-
ally thin or illiquid market conditions in which banks
and dealers could not obtain needed funding at a 
reasonable cost. Indeed, it seemed possible that these
defensive actions could bring about the very outcome
they were meant to guard against—a breakdown in 
market functioning. 
To maintain orderly conditions in the country’s 
capital markets around the year-end, the Federal
Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee took an
extraordinary step: it directed the Open Market Trading
Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“the
Desk”) to establish a Standby Financing Facility. The
facility would make available to primary dealers a form
of backup funding—the opportunity to buy options on
temporary RPs with the Desk. Through this action and a
related initiative to create a special lending facility for
banks, the Federal Reserve sought to assure the markets
that it was fully prepared to provide liquidity if normal
trading activities were disrupted.1
In this edition of Current Issues, we explain how the
sale of RP options through the Standby Financing
Facility was intended to influence conditions in the 
capital markets critical to monetary operations.
Specifically, we review the Federal Reserve’s concerns
about potential market disturbances around the year-end
and describe how the options were designed to avert
such events. Our assessment suggests that the central
bank’s efforts did in fact have a stabilizing effect on the
markets. Although the exact contribution made by the
options program is difficult to isolate, anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the options exerted a calming
influence by easing anxieties about prospective market
conditions. A further sign of the options’effectiveness is
provided by the behavior of year-end funding premiums.
These premiums declined substantially at key times 
during the conduct of the options program, suggesting
that the availability of the options helped allay market
participants’ worst fears about high borrowing costs
around the date change.
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Potential Market Disruptions Associated 
with the Century Date Change
As the century date change approached, the fear of
computer problems spurred market participants to test
and upgrade their technical systems and to formulate
contingency operating plans. But while individual deal-
ers and banks might be confident about their own Y2K
preparations, they could not assess their trading partners’
vulnerabilities to a technical failure. As a consequence,
a number of market participants sought to minimize
their exposure to counterparty risk in the weeks sur-
rounding the date change. They expressed the view that
the best defense against unknown risks during this
period was to reduce settlement, issuance, and trading
volumes and to apply credit limits very strictly.
This reluctance to engage in normal trading activi-
ties posed a particular problem for the Federal Reserve.
If participants in the short-term federal funds and RP
financing markets scaled back their lending and invest-
ment activities, then banks and dealers might be unable
to finance their positions in the usual way—or to secure
replacement financing at a reasonable cost (see box). In
a climate of heightened uncertainty, financing difficul-
ties at one institution could spread rapidly to others, and
even ordinary disturbances to trading patterns could
have a magnified effect on short-term interest rates. 
For example, if cash investors at year-end refrained
from lending to securities dealers except at exorbitant
rates, then the dealers—including primary dealer coun-
terparties in the Desk’s monetary operations—would be
compelled to pay these rates to finance their holdings of
securities. Those dealers that could not pay extremely
high rates could be forced to default. In such a situation,
the Desk’s ordinary open market operations might prove
to be of limited value in counteracting the deterioration
in credit conditions. 
Under ordinary circumstances, the Federal Open Market
Committee instructs the Manager of the System Open
Market Account to use open market operations to maintain
the overnight federal funds rate around the target level
needed to achieve the Committee’s policy objectives. The
federal funds rate is the interest rate at which banks lend to
one another the balances they hold in their Federal Reserve
deposit accounts.
In the federal funds market, banks exchange funds to off-
set charges and credits to their Federal Reserve balances
arising from the settlement of financial payments and to
ensure that banks satisfy their two-week maintenance period
reserve requirements and clearing balance requirements. A
bank is penalized if it fails to meet all of its requirements, or
if its Federal Reserve account is overdrawn at the end of any
day. The federal funds rate is sensitive to the aggregate 
supply of banks’ balances measured against their total
requirements. The rate will rise if banks are at risk of ending
a day overdrawn or if they fail to meet the maintenance
period’s requirements; it will fall if banks are in jeopardy of
holding unwanted excess reserves.
The aggregate supply of Federal Reserve balances held
by banks is subject to various influences outside the control
of the Desk. Accordingly, the Desk uses open market opera-
tions—purchases or sales of securities—to manage the 
supply of balances, making these operations its instrument
for influencing the federal funds rate. That is, banks’
accounts at the Federal Reserve are credited or debited in
payment for any securities exchanged in the Desk’s opera-
tions, altering the supply of balances. Open market trans-
actions take several forms, but repurchase agreements
(RPs) are the most common. RPs are similar to a loan by
the Federal Reserve at an agreed-upon interest rate, with
securities pledged as collateral. In October 1999, the Desk
expanded the collateral eligible for its RPs to include
mortgage-backed securities issued by government-
sponsored entities in addition to direct obligations of these
entities and the U.S. Treasury.a Balances created by RPs
are automatically extinguished upon their maturity.
The counterparties in the Desk’s open market operations,
called primary dealers, are securities firms and other active
participants in the secondary government debt market.
These dealers finance the large inventories of government
securities held as a by-product of their ordinary business
activities by borrowing from large institutional investors
under very short-term RPs every day. Balances are created
through the Desk’s RPs when the Federal Reserve, in pay-
ment for the securities acquired under RPs, credits the Fed
accounts of the clearing banks at which the primary dealers
maintain deposit accounts.
Each morning, the Desk evaluates the need for open 
market operations, including RPs, based on available esti-
mates of the supply of and demand for balances. Operations
designed to adjust that day’s supply of balances are typically
arranged around 9:30 a.m. eastern time, mostly with an
overnight maturity.
Monetary Operations under Routine Market Conditions
aAt its August 1999 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee authorized the Desk to accept an expanded pool of col-
lateral on temporary operations through April 2000; it subsequently extended this authorization through the end of 2000. Uncertainties about the availability of short-term
financing around the year-end were reflected in ele-
vated futures rates. As early as spring 1999, spreads
between monthly December and January eurodollar
futures rates were well above levels ordinarily associ-
ated with past year-end dates, and these spreads
climbed steadily over the summer months (Chart 1).
The Use of Options to Alleviate Market Disruptions
In anticipation of the century date change, the Federal
Reserve took steps to soften the impact that technical
problems—and the risk-avoidance behavior brought on
by those problems—might have on the functioning of
the capital markets. To help ensure that banks would
have adequate liquidity to meet any unusual demands
around the date change, the Federal Reserve’s Board of
Governors in July voted to establish a Century Date
Change Special Liquidity Facility for lending to deposi-
tory institutions between October 1, 1999, and April 7,
2000. The facility was designed to provide participants
in the federal funds market with an alternative source of
funding for meeting daily clearing and settlement needs
during a time of increased uncertainty. Although the
funding came at a premium—the interest rate for bor-
rowing from this facility was 150 basis points above the
prevailing federal funds target rate—the facility was not
intended for routine use; rather, it was expected to
eliminate some worst-case scenarios for borrowers in
the federal funds market. 
However, because of banks’expressed unwillingness
to commit themselves to extending the benefits of this
facility to their customers, the Special Liquidity Facility
proved to have only limited power to shape expectations
about the availability of year-end liquidity in other
financing markets. Specifically, primary dealers unable
to secure financing in the RP market could not assume
that their correspondent bank would mediate by extend-
ing this special funding to them.
Accordingly, to make available to the primary dealer
community some of the protections that the Special
Liquidity Facility offered banks, in August the Federal
Open Market Committee authorized the Desk to estab-
lish a temporary Standby Financing Facility that would
enable dealers to buy options on temporary operations.
The Desk subsequently developed a program to auction
“call” options on overnight RPs with the Desk; the
holder could exercise the options on specified days
around the year-end at a preset strike price, or borrow-
ing rate, that was—like the interest rate offered banks
under the Special Liquidity Facility—150 basis points
above the prevailing federal funds target rate. If dealers
that held these options could not obtain alternative
funding at a lower interest rate, they could turn to the
Desk directly for funding.
In creating the options, the Federal Reserve reasoned
that it could prevent market RP rates from rising above
the strike price if it offered a sufficient supply of
options contracts to meet demand fully. But more fun-
damentally, the Fed hoped that the facility would sus-
tain liquidity in the weeks before and after the century
date change by easing market anxieties and encourag-
ing primary dealers to continue to make markets and
undertake their typical intermediation activities in the
securities markets. In the Fed’s view, even dealers that
did not hold options might benefit from the existence of
the Standby Financing Facility if the perception that
holders were prepared to maintain usual trading behav-
ior around the date change encouraged other market
participants to do the same.
Options Contract Features and the Auction Process
Through the Standby Financing Facility, the Desk sold
daily options contracts for all dates from December 23,
1999, through January 12, 2000. Each individual con-
tract gave the holder the right to arrange with the Desk
a one-business-day RP for $50 million at a preset strike
price 150 basis points above the prevailing federal
funds target rate. No secondary market trading in the
options was permitted.  
For operational convenience, the daily options were
packaged into three weekly “strips,” with the first strip
covering December 23 to December 29, the second cover-
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Chart 1
Year-End Short-Term Interest Rate Premiums
Spread between Rates on December and January Monthly 
LIBOR Futures Contracts, Daily Observations
Source: Bloomberg L.P.
Notes: October 20 is the date of the first options auction and December 1 is the 
date of the last auction. Monthly LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) futures 
contracts reflect expected average monthly eurodollar deposit rates for dates 
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140ing December 30 to January 5, and the third covering
January 6 to January 12. Purchasers of any weekly strip
could elect whether to exercise the individual daily
overnight options contracts within the strip on a day-by-
day basis. Although dealers exercising the options could
submit any type of collateral accepted for the Desk’s ordi-
nary RPs, it was assumed that they would most likely
deliver mortgage-backed securities, since these instru-
ments tend to be relatively costly to finance in the market.
Dealers were required to notify the Desk by 10 a.m. if
they wished to exercise an overnight options contract
under the terms described above.2 In choosing 10 a.m. as
the ordinary time of expiry, the Desk sought to balance
its own reserve management concerns with dealers’
desire to have as much time as possible to address
potential funding surprises. Since the bulk of the deal-
ers’ daily financing activity is completed by 10 a.m.,
this exercise deadline gave them time to gauge their
funding needs. The deadline also provided the Desk with
sufficient time to arrange other open market operations
each day to account for the reserve impact of the exer-
cised options. 
The first of what proved to be seven weekly rounds
of auctions was held on October 20, far enough ahead
of the century date change for the options to begin hav-
ing an effect on the expectations of market participants.
The quantity of each strip that the Desk intended to sell
was announced before each round. For each strip, each
primary dealer was allowed to place two bids for itself
as well as two bids for each customer bidding through
the dealer.3 Bids were accepted in basis-point terms,
with each basis point representing a cost of about $278
for every $1 billion of overnight RP options contracts.
Because dealers were expected to have difficulty valu-
ing these novel options, a uniform price auction format
was adopted, whereby all accepted bids were awarded at
the minimum accepted offering price. 
Bids were accepted and the results released to deal-
ers over the same electronic systems that the Desk uses
for its regular RPs, and premium payments on awarded
bids were due the following day. At the conclusion of
each round of auctions, the Desk publicly released
information on total bids, final awards, and the price at
which accepted bids were awarded for each strip. 
Risks Posed by the Desk’s Strategy 
Under the Standby Financing Facility, the Desk
intended to sell enough contracts in the aggregate to
ensure that the options would be viewed as a relatively
inexpensive source of financing insurance. The quantity
sold at each weekly round of auctions would be
adjusted in response to the strength of demand at the
previous round so that, in the end, all market partici-
pants would have the opportunity to purchase options at
a relatively low cost. The Desk calculated that this strat-
egy for determining the total supply of options could in
itself soften risk perceptions and reduce the likelihood
that the tight credit conditions necessitating the exercise
of options would actually develop.
Under the terms of the options contracts, the Desk
was in the unique position of bearing no default risk on
its ability to arrange RPs. Nevertheless, selling a large
quantity of options presented certain risks in the event
that the options were exercised.4
Most notably, the Desk foresaw that to prevent the
federal funds rate from falling below the target level, it
might need to drain large reserve balances created by
exercised options. To do so, the Desk would have to
modify the structure of its other open market opera-
tions, either by cutting back its use of ordinary RPs or
by arranging matched sale-purchase agreements
(MSPs), which function like reverse RPs, to drain
reserves later in the day. Either plan, however, involved
a potential cost. On the one hand, reducing the volume
of ordinary RPs would entail an opportunity cost, mea-
sured by the spread between the strike price on the
options and the higher market rate that the Desk could
have earned on newly arranged RPs. On the other hand,
arranging MSPs would entail a direct loss, measured by
the spread between the higher market rates that the
Desk would likely have to pay on the MSPs and the
lower strike rate on the options.5
In addition, the Desk might be unable to arrange
matched sale-purchase agreements if dealers, ordinarily
large net borrowers of funds in the financing markets,
were reluctant to participate. If the Desk could not
arrange a sufficient volume of MSPs, then the federal
funds rate could plummet later in the day, or later in that
period if the supply of balances for the two-week main-
tenance period could not be brought down in line with
banks’ requirements. 
To be sure, the Desk was prepared to abandon its
practice of keeping the daily supply of balances within
a fairly narrow range. If intense upward rate pressures
and broad-based market dislocations triggered a wide-
spread exercise of options, then the Desk was willing to
accept an overabundance of balances in the interests of
countering market stress. Nevertheless, an overabun-
dance of balances on one day could make it impossible
for the Desk to steer the period-average level of bal-
ances back to a level in line with banks’requirements—
an outcome that would likely give rise to strong down-
ward pressures on the federal funds rate later in the
maintenance period.
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risks posed by the options program, it concluded that
they were not very likely to materialize. Moreover, it
seemed clear that any potential costs of the Desk’s
actions fell far short of the costs that could be expected to
arise from a breakdown in established financing patterns.
Auction Results
Not surprisingly, demand for the December 30 options
strip exceeded that for each of the other two strips (see
table). Because the December 30 strip spanned the turn
of the year, when market participants foresaw the great-
est potential for disruption, it consistently drew the
greatest number of bids. In addition, the strip was
almost always awarded at the highest rates, even with
the larger quantities sold. By these same measures,
demand for the January 6 strip was stronger than
demand for the December 23 strip, likely reflecting the
view that if Y2K problems did emerge around the cen-
tury date change, they could linger through the early
weeks of January.
Demand at the first round of auctions surpassed the
Desk’s expectations and continued to run very strong
over the next two auctions, especially as measured by the
relatively high rates on propositions. These early results
prompted the Desk to increase the quantities of options
to be sold over the first few rounds, and the decision was
made to add two more weekly rounds of auctions.
However, the diminishing volume of bids submitted dur-
ing the final rounds of auctions and the declining rates
on accepted bids suggested that demand was ultimately
satisfied. Total premiums collected by the Federal
Reserve on all options summed to $6,074,104.
The general bidding profile is illustrated in Chart 2,
which shows cumulative bid amounts and rates for the
December 30 strip at three of the auctions. All auctions
attracted a certain number of seemingly aggressive
bids, represented by the steeper portion of the demand
schedules at the lower volumes. As the auction cycle
progressed and demand became sated, however, the bid-
ding curves flattened.
Conclusion
As it turned out, the financing markets experienced no
date-change-related problems that disrupted trading.
Accordingly, conditions in the markets that would have
made it profitable to exercise the Federal Reserve’s
options never materialized (Chart 3). 
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Demand Schedules for the December 30 Options Strip
Quantity (billions of dollars)
Results of Standby Financing Facility Auctions
Billions of Dollars, Except As Noted
Auction Date
Auction Oct. 20 Oct. 27 Nov. 3 Nov. 10 Nov. 17 Nov. 23 Dec. 1
December 23 options strip
Auction amount  12 12 20 30 15 10 15
Total propositions 48 56 77 44 49 27 20
Stop-out rate (basis points) 1.5 2.5 11.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 0.5
December 30 options strip
Auction amount 18 25 50 50 30 25 25
Total propositions 116 147 136 86 83 51 53
Stop-out rate (basis points) 10.0 15.0 16.0 8.0 8.0 4.0 2.0
January 6 options strip
Auction amount 12 12 25 40 20 20 15
Total propositions 67 86 108 66 64 36 44
Stop-out rate (basis points) 3.0 5.0 11.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.0
Note: The stop-out rate for each auction is the lowest rate on all accepted bids.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Immediately before and after the century date
change, overnight RP rates on all types of collateral eli-
gible for the Desk’s RPs never approached the strike-
price threshold, and the federal funds rate itself tended
to be a bit below the target level. This outcome may
have stemmed largely from the Desk’s other reserve
management operations at the time. For instance, the
large outstanding volume of ordinary RPs arranged by
the Desk convinced some participants in the federal
funds market that the Desk intended to provide enough
balances for banks to satisfy all of their requirements.
Moreover, by year-end, the considerable amount of col-
lateral that the Desk held under outstanding RPs may
have driven down rates in the RP market. 
To what degree the Federal Reserve’s Standby
Financing Facility can be credited with averting market
disruptions cannot be established conclusively. How-
ever, at least two factors point to the facility’s stabilizing
role. For one, implied year-end funding premiums
declined substantially when the details of the options
auction were unveiled, after the early auction results
were announced, and later on when the Desk extended
the number of auctions. Moreover, anecdotal evidence
suggests that the options exerted a calming influence on
the markets. In conversations with the Desk, many deal-
ers indicated that the options program helped ease their
anxieties about prospective market conditions around
the year-end. 
Notes
1. These actions are outlined in Domestic Open Market Operations
during 1999, the Open Market Trading Desk’s annual report (avail-
able at <http://www.ny.frb.org/pihome/annual.html>).
2. However, the December 30-January 5 strip, which bridged the
shift to the new century, had a feature that allowed holders to exer-
cise options between 10 a.m. and 11:30 a.m.—albeit at a strike price
250 points above the prevailing federal funds target rate.
3. In submitting bids on behalf of a customer, dealers were contrac-
tually obligated to ensure the performance of their customers on all
aspects of the transaction, just as they are obligated to ensure cus-
tomer performance when they bid on the Desk’s ordinary RPs.
4. Some risks faced by the Desk were analogous to those borne by
writers of call options in the private markets. Significantly, no
mechanism existed for the Desk to hedge its risks, and even if one
did, hedging would have undermined the public purpose of the
options program by restoring to the market some of the risks that the
Desk sought to remove.
5. Market RP rates on mortgage-backed and federal agency debt—
the types of collateral the Desk would most likely have received on
exercised options—are generally higher than the corresponding RP
rates on Treasury securities, which are what the Desk delivers to
dealers when it arranges MSPs. But these differences in market
rates largely reflect the varying degrees of risk associated with the
different collateral types.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
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